A. Schulman, Inc. DEFA14A
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
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A. Schulman, Inc.
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A. Schulman, Inc. issued the following press release.
A. SCHULMAN URGES STOCKHOLDERS TO ELECT THE COMPANYS EXPERIENCED
AND QUALIFIED SLATE OF DIRECTORS
- Says to Reject Ramius Conflicted and Beholden Director Nominees -
- PROXY Governance Supports Companys Slate -
- Company Rejects Recommendations from ISS and Glass Lewis -
AKRON, Ohio, January 7, 2008 A. Schulman Inc. (Nasdaq: SHLM) today reiterated its recommendation
that stockholders reelect new CEO and current Board member, Joseph M. Gingo, as well as independent
directors James A. Karman, James A. Mitarotonda, and independent Board nominee, Stanley W.
Silverman to the Board at the Companys January 10, 2008 Annual Meeting of Stockholders. A.
Schulman also commented on the recent proxy advisory reports issued by PROXY Governance, Glass
Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).
THE COMPANY URGES STOCKHOLDERS TO VOTE FOR THE COMPANYS NOMINEES BY
SUBMITTING THE WHITE PROXY
CARD BY INTERNET, TELEPHONE OR MAIL TODAY.
PROXY Governance
Lead independent director of the Company, Will Holland, said: We are very pleased that PROXY
Governance has recommended in favor of our slate of directors and recognized A. Schulmans
willingness to work constructively with our institutional stockholders to effect change at the
Company. PROXY Governance has acknowledged that the Board has gone through tremendous
transformations over the past several years and is absolutely committed to delivering profitable
growth with a heightened sense of urgency. Our fourth quarter 2007 and recently announced first
quarter results are proof that our initiatives are working.
Since 2005 we have added two additional directors sponsored by the activist hedge fund, Barington
Capital Group LP, as well as adding two more independent directors approved by Barington. All four
of these additions occurred while Barington and Ramius were partners. We have a healthy and open
dialogue among the independent directors on our transformed Board and are confident that they will
continue to challenge management and provide guidance for the strategic initiatives currently
underway. The addition of two activist-supported and conflicted Board members running on a single
platform of sell the company will derail the current turn-around plan and could jeopardize the
progress made to date just as we are beginning to see results. Further, having representatives of
two opposing activist groups could cause grid-lock in the Boardroom.
In its January 4, 2008 report supporting the Companys slate of Directors, PROXY Governance urged
shareholders to support new CEO Joe Gingo and the Companys independent Board:
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...we recognize that the board has undergone significant turnover in the last three years. |
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...we believe that the reconstituted board, as well CEO Gingos approach to the companys current challenges, warrant
shareholder support at this time. |
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...we are not convinced that these [Ramius] criticisms continue to apply to the new board. |
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New CEO Gingo is candid about the challenges facing the company, and adamant that its direction must be infused with a new
sense of urgency and open-mindedness. |
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...we are concerned about the possible additional disruption that his [Mr. Gingos] failure to gain re-election at the
annual meeting could cause. |
ISS
We are very disappointed by ISS January 4, 2008 recommendation and believe it is driven by a
flawed and incomplete analysis, commented Mr. Holland. The Company rejects the ISS
recommendation and notes that the report contains multiple inaccuracies and extremely misleading
commentary and conclusions.
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ISS INACCURACY #1: We do not believe that the presence of the dissidents on the board would
materially disrupt any ongoing restructuring process and/or strategic process. |
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THE TRUTH: The reality is that if Ramius nominees are elected to the Board, four of the Board
seats would be held by activist shareholders since the Board already includes Mr. Mitarotonda
from Barington and Mr. McManus, who was nominated by Barington. Ramius and Barington were
acting together in their investment in the Company until March 2007, when they announced their
independence from each other. A. Schulman has been working successfully and cooperatively with
Barington to look at all options to enhance long-term shareholder value, and the Company
believes the termination of the relationship between the two activists was the result of Ramius
dissatisfaction with this cooperative approach and its preference for a quick sale of the
Company. Further, the termination of the Barington/Ramius relationship demonstrates that they
have different agendas. These different views would likely result in dissension and distraction
on the Board that may paralyze the Companys ability to continue to make the changes that are
already delivering significant shareholder value. |
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ISS INACCURACY #2: Ramius nominees are independent. |
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THE TRUTH: Ramius nominees are conflicted and are being compensated to do Ramius bidding.
Ramius has promised its nominees a profit sharing payment, payable when Ramius exits its holding
in A. Schulman, thereby motivating Ramius nominees to push for a quick sale of the Company. In
addition, Messrs. Meyer and Caporale have a previous business relationship having worked
together at Ply Gem Industries, Inc., a vinyl siding business (which has no relevant application
to A. Schulmans line of business), leading to further concerns about their ability to operate
independently from each other. A. Schulmans nominees will continue the Boards work to create
immediate value for shareholders through ongoing restructuring efforts, considering all external
opportunities that would deliver exceptional value for shareholders, and pursuit of longer-term
strategic initiatives that maximize shareholders investment. |
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ISS INACCURACY #3: We would have liked to see the company or the boards nominating
committee conducting an extensive external and internal search for a new CEO to ensure that
the best candidate is selected for the job. |
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THE TRUTH: The Company responded to the need to identify a new and experienced CEO quickly who
would be able to act with the sense of urgency required to drive forward all strategic
initiatives. A. Schulman identified a highly-qualified candidate, Mr. Gingo, who has both the
institutional knowledge of the Company needed to maintain momentum and the |
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turn around and international experience necessary to act effectively to improve profitability
and drive growth. |
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ISS INACCURACY #4: The Company announced that it adopted a 100 day plan. However, the plan
does not disclose any predefined metrics against which shareholders could benchmark the
companys performance. |
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THE TRUTH: A. Schulman has had a set of metrics in place since April 2007, which Mr. Gingo and
his 100 day plan will continue to be measured against, namely: cash flow, return on investment,
net income and total shareholder return. |
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ISS INACCURACY #5: We also note that the plan includes some of the initiatives suggested by
the Ramius analysis...These initiatives suggest that the company has been reactive. |
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THE TRUTH: A. Schulman is not merely reactive, but rather has been responsive, open and willing
to maintain a healthy dialogue with its shareholders. The Company has worked cooperatively with
activist investor Barington Capital and shown willingness to add a Ramius representative to the
Board. Why should the Company be criticized for listening and taking action? |
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ISS INACCURACY #6: ISS recommends that shareholders vote FOR the expansion of the board to
include the two dissident nominees and the removal of incumbent director James Karmen. |
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THE TRUTH: Shareholders are not able to vote on expansion of the Board and voting for both
dissident nominees would result in A. Schulman CEO Joseph Gingo being removed from the Board,
causing significant disruption and a likely breakdown of communication between management and
the Board at a critical time. |
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ISS INACCURACY #7: ...Joseph M. Gingo, the company CEO, is an insider on the Compensation and
Nominating & Corporate Governance committees. Note that our policy provides that shareholder
withhold votes from Joseph M. Gingo for standing as an insider on the Compensation and
Nominating committees. |
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THE TRUTH: Upon commencement of his employment as CEO on January 1, 2008, Mr. Gingo resigned
his positions on these committees, a fact that had been communicated to ISS during the Companys
discussions but was unfortunately ignored by ISS, further reflecting the incomplete analysis
conducted in this situation. |
Mr. Holland continued, We warn stockholders that Ramius nominees are focused only on Ramius own
interests as evidenced by the fact that both Messrs. Caporale and Meyer would receive a
compensation bonus when Ramius exits its holding in A. Schulman. These two Board nominees have no
Company or real industry knowledge and have not agreed to go through the Companys Governance
Committees review process to confirm their independence. We are convinced that Ramius nominees
are incented to simply do Ramius bidding rather than act in the interest of all shareholders.
Further, we believe Ramius single-minded agenda will only distract from the Boards focus and
undermine the CEO and the Boards ability to deliver immediate results.
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Glass Lewis
We firmly oppose Glass Lewis split vote recommendation in its December 24, 2007 report and firmly
believe the Companys full slate is the right team to guide A. Schulman. Our Board nominees
provide the necessary balance of experience and fresh perspective, with 11 of 12 Board seats being
held by independent directors and five of these directors joining the Board since 2005. We also
note that the Glass Lewis recommendation is impractical as voting for even one of Ramius nominees
would prohibit our stockholders from voting for more than two of A. Schulmans experienced and
highly-qualified directors, stated Mr. Holland.
While disagreeing with Glass Lewis split vote recommendation, the Company agrees with Glass Lewis
report expressing doubt about Ramius ability to effect change at the Company. Specifically, the
report noted the following:
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...we find that the Dissident [Ramius] has failed to present a
substantive plan for improvement, other than advocating a sale of the
company. |
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We make this recommendation knowing that the presence of this nominee
[Lee Meyer] may not result in immediate operational improvements. |
Glass Lewis also acknowledged the significant steps the Company has taken to improve corporate
governance and address stockholder concerns:
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In addition, we note that the Company has recently taken actions that we believe will be
beneficial for the Company and its stockholders, including restructuring efforts, the
appointment of a new CEO, and corporate governance improvements (redemption of a poison pill
and appointment of a lead independent director). The Company has also agreed to form a
special committee to consider strategic alternatives, including a potential sale of the
Company. |
THE COMPANY URGES STOCKHOLDERS TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION AND
SUPPORT THE COMPANYS SLATE, WHICH IS COMMITTED TO
DELIVERING VALUE FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS.
A. Schulman CEO Joseph M. Gingo said: I am confident that the Company is poised for a turn-around,
capitalizing on the restructuring efforts implemented to date and those changes that I intend to
make in order to drive profitable growth. Ramius claims to be offering stockholders an
alternative; however, they are not offering a new or different strategy for A. Schulman or in
fact any strategy at all except to sell the Company and a vote for any of its nominees would
simply distract from the Companys ongoing successful efforts to transform our business and result
in a Board dominated by two differing activist agendas.
Mr. Holland continued: An entirely independent Special Committee of the Board is in the process of
reviewing all external strategic alternatives for the Company, proactively addressing Ramius
stockholder proposal. We reject Ramius assertion that we are not committed to this process and
reaffirm that we are fully engaged in identifying all value creating opportunities for A. Schulman.
Clearly, Ramius is in this for short-term gain at the expense of achieving the greater value the
Company and stockholders will realize from moving forward with both the implementation of our
current strategy and a thorough review of external opportunities.
We have always maintained an open dialogue with our outside stockholders, including Ramius
one-time partner, Barington Capital. In fact, we have attempted to resolve this hostile proxy
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contest in a manner responsive to stockholder interests, but Ramius remains unwilling to do so.
Instead, they are insisting on carrying out a costly proxy fight that benefits no one and
potentially jeopardizes our gains to date. We are already proactively addressing each of the
issues they have raised, concluded Mr. Holland.
THE COMPANY URGES STOCKHOLDERS TO VOTE FOR THE COMPANYS NOMINEES BY
SUBMITTING THE WHITE PROXY
CARD BY INTERNET, TELEPHONE OR MAIL TODAY.
If you have any questions, require assistance with voting your WHITE proxy card, or need additional
copies of proxy materials, please call Georgeson, which is assisting A. Schulman with the proxy
solicitation, at 877-668-1646.
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Contacts
Paul DeSantis
CFO and Treasurer of A. Schulman Inc.
330-666-3751
Nina Devlin/Giovanna Konicke
Brunswick Group
212-333-3810
About A. Schulman, Inc.
Headquartered in Akron, Ohio, A. Schulman is a leading international supplier of high-performance
plastic compounds and resins. These materials are used in a variety of consumer, industrial,
automotive and packaging applications. The Company employs about 2,500 people and has 17
manufacturing facilities in North America and Europe (including Asia). Revenues for the fiscal
year ended August 31, 2007, were $1.8 billion. Additional information about A. Schulman can be
found at http://www.aschulman.com.
Forward-Looking Statements
Certain statements in this release may constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of
the Federal securities laws. These statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate
strictly to historic or current facts. They use such words as anticipate, estimate, expect,
project, intend, plan, believe, and other words and terms of similar meaning in connection
with any discussion of future operating or financial performance. These forward-looking statements
are based on currently available information, but are subject to a variety of uncertainties,
unknown risks and other factors concerning the Companys operations and business environment, which
are difficult to predict and are beyond the control of the Company. Important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those suggested by these forward-looking statements,
and that could adversely affect the Companys future financial performance, include, but are not
limited to, the following:
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Worldwide and regional economic, business and political conditions, including continuing
economic uncertainties in some or all of the Companys major product markets; |
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Fluctuations in the value of currencies in major areas where the Company operates,
including the U.S. dollar, euro, U.K. pound sterling, Canadian dollar, Mexican peso,
Chinese yuan and Indonesian rupiah; |
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Fluctuations in the prices of sources of energy or plastic resins and other raw
materials; |
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Changes in customer demand and requirements; |
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Escalation in the cost of providing employee health care; |
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The outcome of any legal claims known or unknown; and |
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The performance of the North American auto market. |
Additional risk factors that could affect the Companys performance are set forth in the Companys
Annual Report on Form 10-K. In addition, risks and uncertainties not presently known to the Company
or that it believes to be immaterial also may adversely affect the Company. Should any known or
unknown risks or uncertainties develop into actual events, or underlying assumptions prove
inaccurate, these developments could have material adverse effects on the Companys business,
financial condition and results of operations.
This release contains time-sensitive information that reflects managements best analysis only as
of the date of this release. A. Schulman does not undertake an obligation to publicly update or
revise any forward-looking statements to reflect new events, information or circumstances, or
otherwise. Further information concerning issues that could materially affect financial performance
related to forward-looking statements can be found in A. Schulmans periodic filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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